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FRANCE: THE UK SHOULD REMAIN BUT NOT AT 
ALL COSTS
 No one has forgotten that UK’s request to 
join the European Community was the cause of great 
resistance on the part of French President Charles de 
Gaulle in the 1960’s. On two occasions in 1963 and 
1967 De Gaulle used his veto to the UK’s membership, 
deeming above all that London’s “special relationship” 
with Washington meant that the country was not a 
sufficiently independent partner to provide inspiration to 
the continental European project. The situation changed 
with the election in 1969 of Georges Pompidou who 
yielded to the UK’s accession on the grounds of the 
balance of power. German economic successes and the 
launch of the Bonn’s Ostpolitik with the countries of the 
Socialist Bloc were beginning to worry French diplomacy 
in terms of Germany’s rising power. It was said then 
in Paris that the UK’s membership of the European 
Community would be a useful means to balancing this 
rise. 
 Since January 1st 1973, when the UK joined 
the European Community, from Paris’s point of view, 
the reason for good relations with London has always 
been more political than economic. Both countries are 
permanent members of the UN Security Council. They 
are the only ones to have a national defence policy that 
mobilises around 2% of their government spending. 
They have a tradition of military intervention and an 
arms industry. For a long time France mainly saw in 
the UK a pragmatic means to consolidate the European 
defence policy. Negotiations over this have not always 
been easy since London has insisted on recalling the 
priority given to NATO, whose Integrated Military 
Command France quit in 1966, only to re-join in 2009. 
The “Saint Malo Agreements” signed in 1998 by Jacques 
Chirac and Tony Blair did however enable the relaunch of 
the institutionalisation of the European defence policy – 
a commitment that London will find it difficult to adhere 
to in 2015 due to the debate over the Brexit.
Three reasons to keep the UK in
 There is no doubt that the French government 
– at present on the left - but without there being any 
great difference were it on the right – does not want 
the UK to leave the European Union definitively for at 
least three reasons. 
 The first reason is that Paris, as a founding 
member of the European Community, is convinced that 
the EU is a political experiment that would emerge 
seriously damaged by any disintegration. Although 
in principle the treaties provide for the departure 
of a Member State, this in fact would be seen as a 
clear sign of political failure that could feed European 
debate that is already quite morose in France. Any 
French government would indeed fear that official 
disintegration would strengthen the Eurosceptic 
rhetoric of the parties on the far right and far left, and 
also some Socialist Party and Republicans members. In 
2015 there is not one French political party that openly 
campaigns for a total exit by France from the EU, unlike 
UKIP or some of the Conservatives in the UK. The Front 
National advocates France’s exit of the euro area. But 
departure by the UK from the EU might tempt the Front 
National leaders to ramp up their claim to a higher 
level: total exit from the EU on the grounds that the 
British had now done it. 
 The second reason which obliges any French 
government to prevent the UK’s exit from the EU is the 
objective convergence on diplomacy and defence, as 
well as on other issues, such as civilian nuclear matters. 
In terms of defence Paris has perfectly understood that 
Europe’s participation in world security, increasingly 
alongside the Americans, means working with the 
British in ad hoc coalitions. It was with the UK and the 
USA that Paris decided to intervene in Libya in 2011 to 
bring Colonel Gadhafi’s regime to an end. Regarding 
the conflicts in the Middle East and the fight to counter 
terrorism, exchange with the British diplomatic and 
intelligence services under the CFSP are still extremely 
useful resources to Paris. In a European Union in which 
the German partner is vital in many areas, but less 
in terms of defence due to its history, London is an 
asset that should not be dismissed so readily. The same 
applies to the promotion of civilian nuclear energy. 
British policy aiming to build new reactors is deemed 
as a support to French nuclear policy whilst Berlin has 
decided on a total halt to its nuclear power plants by 
2022.
 The third reason is geopolitical, i.e. it involves 
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the balance of power within the EU. The economic and 
financial crisis that started in 2008 has increased the 
differential in power between France and Germany. 
In 2015 Paris is suffering politically from not having 
succeeded, in spite of the Valls government’s efforts, 
to implement structural reform as quickly as Germany, 
which for its part has enabled the country to reduce 
its unemployment rate and revive growth. Germany’s 
ability to fulfil the macro-economic convergence 
criteria set by the treaties, whilst France is struggling 
to do so, strengthens the credibility and therefore 
Germany’s political supremacy. As in the 1970’s Paris 
wants London to remain a power that can balance out 
the central role played by Germany in the EU.
The French red lines
 In October 2015 the French position on the 
Brexit has not been clearly set. The situation is however 
complicated due to the fact that Prime Minister Cameron 
has no interest in revealing his hand too quickly vis-à-
vis his partners, since this would lead to Eurosceptics 
of his party demanding too many specific things. So for 
the time being there are discreet discussions between 
Paris and London focusing on the main issues. The 
French government is prepared to make concessions 
designed to rally the British to the “yes” during the 
referendum but certainly not at any cost. In Paris there 
are red lines surrounding any renegotiation that would 
strengthen the specific status the UK holds in the EU. 
The first is that British renegotiation would just be a 
pretext for a further reform of the European treaties. 
French government leaders believe that most of the 
present dysfunction in the EU (notably in the euro area) 
can be improved without meddling with the treaties. 
In Paris there is no desire for a further constitutional 
reform of the Union, because this would entail the 
huge risk of having to organise a referendum for its 
ratification. The negative result of the referendum on 
the European constitutional treaty in 2005 has meant 
that the French political class has adopted a very 
careful attitude to direct democracy. This is particularly 
true for François Hollande. In the French system of the 
5th Republic a president who has to assume a negative 
referendum in fact loses all legitimacy. Moreover, since 
division over Europe is expressed in France within the 
political parties rather than between left and right, 
François Hollande has no interest in risking any further 
division within the Socialist Party over Europe. 
Secondly, France is firmly opposed to the fact that 
the four freedoms of movement – deemed to be 
a foundation of the treaties - being affected by any 
renegotiation with the UK. Sometimes David Cameron 
highlights the need to review the principle of social 
rights for workers from EU countries who have moved 
to the UK. Paris is totally against this, deeming that 
Britons can legitimately counter welfare fraud, but 
without challenging the acquis of European law. 
Although the flows have been less than those from 
Poland the number of French citizens employed in the 
UK is significant. In London they total 300,000, making 
the British capital the 7th city of France.
 Thirdly, Paris supports the British idea of 
greater power being granted to national parliaments 
to monitor the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality in European law. A more systematic 
use of the monitoring mechanisms provided for in the 
Lisbon Treaty (the so-called “yellow card” and “orange 
card” system), which means that Europe’s institutions 
have to review their approach, is considered to be 
totally acceptable. However, Paris rejects the idea of 
national parliaments being able to cancel a Commission 
proposal, as advocated by some in London, since 
this would mean modifying a fundamental acquis of 
European integration: the European Commission’s 
power of initiative.
 Finally, Paris is prepared to consider London’s 
demands that aim to involve non-members of the 
euro area more in the decisions that affect the EU’s 
economic future. France has already shown that it is 
open to the association of non-euro area members 
in the European Financial Stability Mechanism and 
Banking Union. However, Paris would never accept 
non-euro area members (and in particular those like 
the UK, who are voluntarily opting out) being able to 
enjoy a right of veto over Eurogroup decisions. 
French Public Opinion and the Brexit
 The negotiation agenda over the Brexit should 
be clearer to Paris, as it will to all of European partners 
after the European Council of December 2015. Although 
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for the time being there is no final French position on 
the Brexit, there is a general framework defining what 
is acceptable and what is not. French public opinion, 
which has been mobilised by the financial aid plans 
to Greece and the issue of distributing refugees, has 
expressed few precise views on the Brexit. There 
are also very few surveys that enable us to take the 
temperature of French opinion on this issue. A survey 
taken on 2nd June 20151 shows however that 43% 
of the French would support a Brexit, which is a high 
figure. It is however interesting to note that 50.5% 
of those interviewed aged 50-69 say they support the 
Brexit whilst 68% of the 15 to 29 year olds are against 
it. The young French person’s view of the UK as a close, 
attractive labour market undoubtedly explains this 
difference in general perception. But in the end the UK’s 
exit of the EU would be harder for government leaders 
(and also for businessmen) to accept in France than 
the French population which often assimilates the UK 
as being the spoke in the European Union’s wheel. 
1. To access the survey consult 
http://mingle-trend.respondi.
com/fr/brexit-avis-des-francais-
sondages/
